The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus :: Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 1 and 2. ::

I. To the Second Question

15. Because according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 2.3.995a13-14: “it is absurd to look for knowledge and the way of knowing at the same time,” I reply first to the second question, which inquires about the way of knowing the proposition ‘God exists’. And, as to its solution, I first set down the idea of a self-evidently known proposition, and I say thus:

When a proposition is said to be self-evidently known, the phrase ‘self-evidently’ does not exclude there being any cause, because it does not exclude the terms of the proposition; for no proposition is known when the knowledge of the terms is excluded, because we know the first principles to the extent we know the terms; but what is excluded is any cause and reason outside the per se conception of the terms of a self-evidently known proposition. A self-evidently known proposition, then, is said to be one that gets its evident truth from nothing outside the proper terms that are part of it.⁴⁸

16. Next, what are those proper terms from which its evidence should come? - I say that, in this regard, one term is the definition and the other the thing defined, whether the terms are taken for the words that signify or for the concepts signified.⁴⁹

17. I prove this from the Posterior Analytics 1.6.75a25-27, because the ‘what it is’ or the definition of one of the extremes is the middle term in demonstration; therefore one of the premises does not differ from the conclusion save as the thing defined differs from the definition, and yet the premise is a self-evidently known principle; the conclusion, however, is not self-evidently known but is demonstrated. Therefore as to the idea of a self-evidently known proposition, the concept of the definition is different from the thing defined, because if the concept of the definition and of the thing defined were the same, there would, in the most potent demonstration, be a begging of the question; again, there would then only be two terms there, which is false.

18. This is proved in a second way as follows, through Aristotle Physics 1.1.184a26-b3, that names relate to the definition as the whole to the parts, that is, that a confused name is first known by the definition; but a name introduces confusedly what a definition introduces distinctly, because a definition divides a thing into its individual parts; therefore the concept of a quiddity, as it is introduced by the name confusedly, is naturally known before its concept, as introduced distinctly by the definition, is known, and so it is another concept and another extreme term.⁵⁰ - From this further: since a self-evidently known proposition is one which has evident truth from the proper terms, and since the other terms are, as introduced by the definition, concepts of the quiddity in a distinct way, and are, as introduced by the name, concepts of the quiddity in a confused way, the conclusion follows that a proposition about a quiddity taken in a confused way will not be self-evidently known when the same proposition is only known if it is conceived distinctly.

19. There is another proof of this conclusion, that otherwise any other proposition, which is necessary and per se in the first mode [Posterior Analytics 1.4.73a34-37] (as this proposition: ‘man is an animal’ and ‘man is a body’, as far as substance), would be self-evidently known; for if the nature of each extreme is assigned by the natures of the extremes when distinctly conceived, it is plainly manifest that one extreme includes the other. Similarly, otherwise any proposition would be self-evidently known in the special sciences that the metaphysician might possess as self-evidently known from the definitions of the extremes, which is not true, because the geometer does not use any principles as self-evidently known save those that have evident truth from terms confusedly conceived, to wit by conceiving line confusedly; but it is evident that a line is length without breadth without yet any distinct conception, in the way considered by the metaphysician, of what genus line pertains to. But the other propositions that the metaphysician could conceive, to wit that line is a quantity and a quantity of this sort, these sort of propositions are not had by the geometer as self-evidently known.

20. This is clear thirdly because the demonstration of some predicate about a defined thing stands well with the predicate being self-evidently known about the definition.⁵¹

21. Therefore all and only those propositions are self-evidently known that, from terms conceived in the way in which they are the terms of the proposition, possess or naturally posses the evident truth of the combined proposition.⁵²

22. From this it is plain that there is no distinction between a self-evidently known and a self-evidently knowable proposition, for they are the same; for a proposition is not called self-evidently known because it is self-evidently known by some intellect (for then, if no intellect actually knew it, no proposition would be self-evidently known), but a proposition is said to be self-evidently known because, as far as depends on the nature of the terms, it is of a nature to possess, even in any intellect that conceives the terms, the evident truth contained in the terms. But if some intellect does not conceive the terms, and so does not conceive the proposition, it is, as far as depends on itself, no less self-evidently known; and it is in this ways that we speak of self-evidently known.

23. From this is also plain that there is no distinction between the self-evidently known in itself to nature and the self-evidently known in itself to us, because whatever is in itself self-evidently known, even if not actually known, is evidently true from the terms and known to any intellect, provided the terms are known.⁵³,⁵⁴

24. Nor is there any validity to the distinction that some propositions are self-evidently known in the first order and some in the second, because any propositions self-evidently known, when the proper terms are conceived in the way they are the terms, possess evident truth in their own order.

25. From these points I say to the question that the proposition which conjoins these extremes: existence and the divine essence as a this or God and his proper existence, is self-evidently known in the way that God sees this essence and existence under the most proper idea that this existence has in God; and in this way neither existence nor essence are understood by us now, but by God himself and by the blessed, because the proposition has from its terms evident truth for the intellect, for the proposition is not per se in the second mode [Posterior Analytics 1.4.73a37-b5], as when the predicate is outside the idea of the subject, but is per se in the first mode [n.19] and is immediately evident from the terms, for it is the most immediate proposition, to which are resolved all assertions about God however he is conceived. Therefore this proposition ‘God exists’ or ‘this essence exists’ is self-evidently known, because the extremes naturally make the complex whole evident to anyone who perfectly apprehends the extremes of this complex whole, for existence belongs to nothing more perfectly than to this essence. In this way, therefore, understanding by the name ‘God’ something that we do not perfectly know or conceive as being this divine essence, thus is ‘God exists’ self-evidently known.

26. But if it be inquired whether existence is present in some concept which we conceive of God, so that the sort of proposition in which existence is asserted of such a concept is self-evidently known, for example as about a proposition whose extreme terms can be conceived by us, that is, whether existence can in our intellect be a concept said of God, though not one common to him and to creatures, namely necessary existence or infinite being or supreme good, and we can of such a concept predicate existence in the way it is conceived by us, - I say that no such proposition is self-evidently known, for three reasons:

27. First, because any such proposition is a demonstrable conclusion, and a ‘conclusion-why’. Proof: anything that first and immediately belongs to something can be demonstrated of whatever is in it ⁵⁵ by a ‘demonstration-why’ through what it first belongs to as through the middle term.⁵⁶ An example: if the triangle is what first has three angles equal to two right angles, of whatever is contained in triangle there can be a demonstration that it has three angles by a ‘demonstration-why’ through the middle term which is triangle, to wit that some figure would have three [angles equal to.. ,| etc ., and also about any kind of triangle that it has three angles., although not first. But existence belongs first to this essence as this essence, in the way it is seen by the blessed; therefore of anything in this essence that can be conceived by us, whether it be as something superior or as a property, existence can be demonstrated through this essence, as through the middle term, by a ‘demonstration-why’, just as by this proposition ‘a triangle has three.’ there is a demonstration that some figure has three.; and consequently it is not self-evidently known from the terms, because then there would be no ‘demonstration-why’.⁵⁷

28. Second in this way: a self-evidently known proposition is self-evidently known to any intellect from the terms. But this proposition ‘there is an infinite being’ is not evident to our intellect from the terms; proof: for we do not conceive the terms before we believe the proposition or know it by demonstration, and it is not known to us in that ‘before’; for we do not hold it with certitude from the terms save by faith or demonstration.

29. Third, because nothing about a concept that is not simply simple is self-evidently known unless it is self-evidently known that the parts of that concept are united; but no concept that we have of God which is proper to him and does not belong to creatures is simply simple, or at any rate no concept that we distinctly conceive to be proper to God is simply simple;⁵⁸ therefore nothing is self-evidently known about such a concept unless it is self-evidently known that the parts of the concept are united; but this is not self-evidently known, because the union of these parts is something demonstrated, by the two reasons mentioned [nn.27-28].

30. The major is manifest from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.29.1024b31-32, that an account in itself false is false about everything; therefore no account is true about anything unless it is in itself true. Therefore in order for something to be true about some account, or for the account to be true about anything, one must known that it is in itself true; but no account is in itself true unless the parts of the account are united. And just as one must know as regard quidditative predications that the parts of the account can be united quidditatively, to wit that one formally contains the other, so as regard the truth of a proposition asserting existence one must know that the parts of the account of the subject or of the predicate are actually united. An example: just as the proposition ‘man is an irrational animal’ is not self-evidently known when speaking of quidditative predication, because the subject includes something in itself false, for it includes a proposition that includes contradictories in itself, so the proposition ‘a man is white’ is not self-evidently known if it is not self-evidently known that man and white are actually per se conjoined; because if they are not conjoined in actual existence, this proposition is true ‘nothing is a white man’, and consequently its converse will be true ‘no white man is’; therefore its contradictory is false ‘a white man is’.

31. Proof of the minor: whatever concept we conceive, whether of good or of true, if it is not contracted by something so that it is not a concept simply simple, is not a proper concept of God. Now I call a concept simply simple which is not resolvable into other simple concepts any one of which might in a simple act be distinctly conceived.

32. From this final reason [sc. the third, nn.29-31] a response to the [following] instances is clear, when the argument is made ‘this is self-evidently known, necessary existence exists’ - proof, because the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject; for if the predicate is not, ‘necessary existence’ does not exist - ‘this too is self-evidently known, God exists’, because, according to all the expositions posited by Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.9, God is called so from actual operation, namely from warming or burning or seeing,⁵⁹ therefore, according to all acceptations of the term, ‘God exists’ is the same as ‘God is actually operating’, which seems self-evidently known, because, as before, the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject.⁶⁰

33. For this reason I reply to these points [n.32] in another way, that neither of these propositions, ‘necessary existence exists’ or ‘the one actually operating exists’, is self-evidently known, because it is not self-evidently known that the parts that are in the subject are actually united. When it is said that ‘the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject’ [n.32], I say that it does not follow from this that the proposition is self-evidently known unless the repugnance is self-evident, and unless it is evident also along with this that each extreme has a simply simple concept or that the concepts of the parts are simply united.⁶¹

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I. To the Second Question